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by Charles Abrams
The new civil offence of market abuse   introduced by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000)   is explained in the following piece.
THE 'CIVIL' OFFENCE OF MARKET ABUSE
One of the important differences between the Financial 
Services Act 1986 (FSA 1986) and the FSMA 2000 is the 
introduction in the latter of the new civil offence of 
market abuse. The term 'civil offence' is used because this 
is how the government describes market abuse. 
Importantly, the penalty for market abuse, which is 
policed and enforced by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), is an unlimited fine or public censure and an 
unlimited obligation to surrender any resulting profits and 
to compensate everyone who has suffered any resulting 
loss (see FSMA 2000 s. 118 - s. 131). The unlimited fine 
seems to make it a criminal offence and, indeed, the 
government has accepted that there is a 'real possibility' 
that it would be treated as a criminal offence for the 
purposes of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The government has therefore provided some 
(but arguably not all) of the procedural protections which 
the ECHR requires in the case of proceedings for a fine.
WHAT IS THE OFFENCE OF MARKET ABUSE?
There are three different offences of market abuse:
(1 ) misusing information which is not generally available 
to the relevant market;
(2) misleading the market; and
(3) distorting the market.
However, behaviour will not constitute market abuse 
unless it is likely to be regarded by a reasonable 'regular 
user' of the market concerned as a failure on the part of 
the putative abuser to 'observe the standard of behaviour 
reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation 
to the market'. This condition is likely to prove to be very 
helpful to 'market innocents' who would otherwise 
unwittingly commit the offence.
In addition, another 'market abuse' offence is 
committed by somebody who requires or encourages 
someone else to commit the offence (see FSMA 2000 s. 
118).
WHO COULD COMMIT THE OFFENCE?
The offence of market abuse can be committed by 
anyone, and not just by FSMA 2000-authorised firms. In 
fact, given that the FSA can also impose unlimited fines on 
firms regulated by it for failing to live up to the standards 
required by the two FSA principles (that they must 
conduct their business with integrity and must observe 
proper standards of market conduct), it is likely that 
market abuse 'prosecutions' will more often be brought 
against firms which are not FSMA 2000-authorised. This
o
is one of the reasons why the government introduced the 
offence of market abuse.
Importantly, market abuse can be committed even 
without intent to abuse the market at all. In addition, it 
applies to all transactions in the prescribed quoted 
securities, even if they are over-the-counter (OTC) 
transactions. In fact it does not need any transaction at all. 
Melanie Johnson MFJ the Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury, made it clear during the debates in Committee 
in the House of Commons that issuing a misleading press 
release could constitute market abuse. Accordingly, not 
only securities houses and banks but also directors of 
quoted companies need to be aware of the offence.
RELATIONSHIP WITH CRIMINAL OFFENCES
The offence of market abuse is based on the existing 
criminal offences of insider dealing (contained in Pt. V of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993) and market manipulation 
(currently in s. 47 of the Financial Services Act 1986 and 
replicated in s. 397 of the FSMA 2000). The two criminal 
offences will continue and in many cases their exemptions 
will not apply to market abuse.
The FSMA 2000 contains a provision allowing the 
Treasury to issue written guidance as to when 
prosecutions should be brought for the civil offence rather 
than the criminal offences. Indeed, the FSA is empowered 
by the Act to bring prosecutions itself for insider dealing 
and market manipulation.
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It is to be hoped that the rules against double jeopardy 
will prevent insider dealing or market manipulation 
prosecutions being brought if a market abuse prosecution 
fails and, of course, the reverse. The UK rule against
' ' O
double jeopardy may not apply, because market abuse is 
technically a civil offence. However, the ECHR outlaws 
double jeopardy for criminal offences. Although the 
relevant provision has not been included in the Human 
Rights Act 1998, one hopes the government will regard it 
as applying, because it has decided to treat market abuse 
as a criminal offence for ECHR purposes (see ECHR, 
Protocol 7, art. 4). In addition, the similar UK doctrine of 
autrefois acquit may apply.
WHAT AMOUNTS TO ABUSIVE 
BEHAVIOUR?
Market abuse is defined as 'abusive' behaviour which 
'occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded on a 
market to which this section applies' (s. 118(l)(a)) 
Qualifying investments are to be prescribed by the 
Treasury, which is also responsible for designating the 
markets subject to the 'market abuse' regime. This 
restriction to behaviour 'in relation to' the qualifying 
investments is, however, not quite as limiting as it seems.
First, 'behaviour' expressly includes inaction as well as 
action, and therefore even a failure to do something can 
constitute market abuse; perhaps a typical example would 
be failing to disclose the acquisition or disposal of an 
interest in shares under s. 198 of the Companies Act 1985.
More importantly, behaviour is to be regarded as 
occurring in relation to qualifying investments if it occurs 
in relation to anything which is the subject matter of the 
qualifying investments or which occurs in relation to 
investments whose subject matter is those qualifying 
investments. Typically, this covers behaviour relating to 
commodities the subject of futures contracts traded in 
London, for example, on the London Metal Exchange. It 
also covers behaviour relating to, for example, options on 
investments quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
In addition, and importantly for non-UK firms, 
behaviour can constitute market abuse not only if it occurs 
in the UK but also if it occurs anywhere else in the world. 
The only proviso is that the investments in relation to 
which it occurs (on this wide definition) are traded on a 
designated market which is situated in the UK or which is 
accessible electronically from the UK. Accordingly, if a 
dealer in New York grants a dealer in Hong Kong a put 
option over shares quoted on the London Stock Exchange, 
his behaviour is, in relevant circumstances, capable of 
constituting market abuse.
o
Indeed, if the Treasury designates either NASDAQ or 
EASDAQ, which although non-UK exchanges are 
accessible electronically from the UK, the offence can be 
committed in relation to securities quoted on them by
behaviour anywhere in the world. It should perhaps be 
noted that, in mid-July 2000, the Treasury designated 
EASDAQ as a regulated market subject to the insider 
dealing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and that 
NASDAQ has always been a regulated market subject to 
them. (See Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) 
Order 1994, SI 1994/187; Insider Dealing (Securities and 
Regulated Markets) (Amendment) Order 2000, SI 2000/1923).
'INNOCENT' MARKET ABUSE
As indicated, the offence of misleading the market can be 
committed without any intent to mislead the market at all. 
Several attempts were made (for example, by the London 
Investment Banking Association (the LIBA), the 
Confederation of British Industry (the CBI), APCIMS and 
the Conservative Party's Treasury Team) to persuade the 
government that it would be unfair to penalise people who 
had no idea that what they were saying or writing could be 
misinterpreted. However, the government stressed that 
market abuse is an effect-based offence and not an intent- 
based offence and, because a market could be prejudiced 
even by behaviour which was merely negligent, refused to 
bring in an intent element. One unfortunate consequence of 
this is that behaviour can constitute misleading the market
o
even if the firm did not anticipate that what it said or wrote 
was misleading; this, moreover, is often not true negligence.
The government did agree, however, that it should be a 
quasi-defence for the accused person to show that he 
believed, on reasonable grounds, that his behaviour did 
not constitute market abuse or the requiring or 
encouraging of market abuse or, alternatively, that he took 
all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence 
to avoid committing any of these offences. This is helpful 
but it seems to require the accused person actually to have 
thought about market abuse. In addition, although the 
defence helpfully stops the FSA imposing a fine (or, 
seemingly issuing a public censure) or requiring 
compensation or a surrender of profits, it still leaves the 
behaviour as constituting market abuse (which is why it is
o ^ J
only a 'quasi-defence'). This may have consequences for 
FSMA 2000-authorised firms or their employees but 
possibly not for anyone else.
The FSA is also directed by the FSMA 2000, although 
not in so many words, to impose a lesser penalty if the 
behaviour was not deliberate or reckless. The 
Conservative Party's Treasury Team tried to amend this 
provision to read that the 'market abuse' was not 
deliberate or reckless but the government maintained its 
position (although one hopes that this was not because it 
wanted to restrict the smaller fine to mere accidents). The 
government also refused to allow the FSA the discretion to
o
take into account the fact that the 'abusive' behaviour 
conformed with existing market practice. (See FSMA 
2000 s. 123 on powers to impose penalties in cases of 
market abuse, and s. 124 (statement of policy)).
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COMPLYING WITH THE FSA'S CODE OF 
MARKET CONDUCT
The FSA is required by the FSMA 2000 to issue a code 
containing guidance on whether particular behaviours 
amount or do not amount to market abuse (s. 119). In July 
2000 it issued a second draft of its proposed 'Code of 
Market Conduct'. The FSA can only explain the offence of 
'market abuse' and not change it. Within that constraint,o '
however, it has clearly tried to be as fair and reasonable as 
possible and has indicated that it is primarily worried 
about market abuse which is intentional. The draft Code 
also provides that activities within specified exemptions 
from the criminal offences of insider dealing and market 
manipulation will not be contrary to the Code. In both 
cases, the behaviour can, however, still constitute the 
statutory offence. Nonetheless, the draft Code seems to 
indicate that the FSA will not impose a fine if there was no 
intent, although it may still require compensation and a 
surrender of profits.
Unfortunately, firms cannot assume that behaviour 
contorming with the Code will necessarily be outside 
market abuse. The FSMA 2000 makes it quite clear that 
the Code is evidential only, unless the FSA states expressly 
that, in its opinion, the particular behaviour does not 
amount to market abuse. When the Bill was in the House 
of Commons, the government accepted that compliance 
with the FSA's conduct of business rules should not 
constitute market abuse. However, the government' o
subsequently restricted the safe harbour in the Lords and 
it is now provided that conformity with an FSA rule will 
not constitute market abuse only if the rule contains a 
provision to the effect that conforming with it does not 
amount to market abuse. Accordingly, FSMA 2000-o J'
authorised firms can be put in the ridiculous position of 
having to choose between complying with the FSA's rules 
and possibly being subject to an unlimited fine for market 
abuse, or other avoiding possible market abuse and being
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subject to an unlimited fine for failure to comply with FSA 
rules.
The government similarly refused any safe harbour at all 
for behaviour conforming with the rules of recognised 
investment exchanges (RIEs), even though it wasO v ' 7 O
emphasised to the government that the FSA could ensure 
that the rules of RIEs did not require anything to be done 
which could constitute market abuse. The FSA's draft 
Code of Market Conduct, however, indicates that the FSA 
will nonetheless provide safe harbours for compliance 
with at least some specified RIE rules. __
It is difficult to see how any market abuse (typically, 
insider dealing or issuing a misleading statement in a press 
release or prospectus) can ever be 'required Of expressly 
permitted' by FSA or RIE rules, which is how the draft 
Code quite properly defines 'conforming with', and these 
safe harbours may therefore not be very helpful in 
practice.
MARKET ABUSE IN THE COURSE OF A 
TAKEOVER BID
The government has insisted that the FSA should have
o
jurisdiction over alleged market abuse even if it occurs in 
the course of a takeover bid. Although the government 
acknowledged the reputation of the Takeover Panel and 
has sought to preserve the self-regulatory status of the 
Panel, despite the forthcoming EU directive on takeovers, 
it was insistent that the FSA should have the ultimate say 
on whether market abuse did or did not occur. The FSA 
has, however, announced that it would, 'as a rule', not 
intervene during a bid where the Panel can itselt take 
'adequate action' to deal with the market abuse and that it 
would always liaise with the Panel before intervening.
Although the government suffered defeat in the Eords 
on this issue, the FSMA 2000 now contains a provision 
that the FSA may include in its Code of Market Conduct 
provision to the effect that behaviour conforming with the 
Panel's Takeover Code does not amount to market abuse 
in particular circumstances). However, such was the 
government's concern about all this that the FSMA 2000,o '
exceptionally, prohibits the FSA from including any such 
provision without the approval of the Treasury. The FSA 
announced in the consultation paper accompanying the 
draft Code of Market Conduct (which does not contain 
any safe harbour for behaviour during takeovers) that it 
was indeed discussing possible safe harbours with the 
Panel and would soon issue some for consultation.
The FSMA 2000 also imposes on the FSA a statutory 
duty to keep itself informed of the way in which the Panel 
interprets and administers the 'safe harbour' provisions of 
the Takeover Code. The government justified this on the 
basis that the FSA would as a result apply the same 
interpretation as the Panel. However, it seems that this 
statutory duty in effect constitutes a 'Sword of Damocles' 
that will always be hanging over the Panel in case the FSA 
does not agree with the Panel's interpretation and 
consequently decides to withdraw the safe harbour. It will 
therefore be prudent for the Panel to make sure that its 
interpretations of the 'safe harbour' provisions are always 
approved in advance by the FSA. (See FSMA 2000 s. 120 
(provisions included in the Authority's code by reference 
to the City Code) and the proposed Thirteenth EC 
Company Eaw Directive on Takeovers 
(COM(97)565)).@
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